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BOOK REVIEWS
Cost Justification. By Herbert F. Taggart. Ann Arbor: Bureau of
Business Research of the University of Michigan, 1959. Pp. 590.
$12.50.
This volume fills an important gap in antitrust literature, as the first
full-length review of the cost defense provided by section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act against a charge of price discrimination-the
defense that the price difference makes "only due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture, sales, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered." The author's reputation in the field was
recognized in 1953 by Chairman Edward F. Howrey of the Commission,
who appointed him to head its Advisory Committee on Cost Justifica-
tion. That Committee's report, dated February 1956-on which the
Commission took no action except to make it available to interested
parties-is printed as the Appendix to the present volume.
There are 480 pages of text dealing with the cost aspects of price
discrimination proceedings brought by the Commission, and forty-five
of the remaining seventy-five pages discuss treble damage suits. In
other words this comes close to being a casebook on the relation of cost
accounting to the law. For lack of information the author can say
nothing of the larger number of company presentations of cost data
that were not made part of formal proceedings.' Such presentations
have been used during Commission investigations in the hope of fore-
stalling complaints, or after issuance of complaints and prior to hear-
ings, with the result either that the complaint was dismissed or that the
respondent, its cost presentation being found insufficient, accepted a
consent order.
Chapter 1 covers the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. case brought
under section 2 of the Clayton Act in 1933. The Commission held
that the discount given by Goodyear to Sears Roebuck was not justified,
and the disclosures in the case "sparked the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act." Chapters 2 to 15 review the fourteen cases under that
statute in which cost justification has been fought out in Federal Trade
Commission hearings. The next chapter says what is possible to say
about the seven Commission cases in which cost justification was dis-
cussed, or is known to have played a decisive role, without the details
being spread on the records. Chapters 17 and 18 review the three
treble damage suits (two against American Can Co., and one against
'See EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATIoN LAW 587 (1959).
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Harper & Brothers) taken to court by customers who had suffered from
price discrimination. Chapter 19 gives the history of the two fruitless
suits brought by the Commission against buyers-here, by contrast with
those against sellers, the burden of proof as to costs was placed on the
Commission, which could not of course carry it. The .book concludes
with two short chapters discussing general principles, followed by the
Advisory Committee report and an eight-page bibliography of books,
reports and articles.
The author disagrees with the Attorney General's National Commit-
tee to Study the Antitrust Laws (whose comments on the cost defense
he reprints) and with former Chairman Howrey-both having called
cost justification "largely illusory." He himself believes this defense to
be "the most practical and available" by comparison with five other
defenses indicated in section 2(a), and suggests that sellers prepare
their cost justification "before a complaint is issued." In this advice he
appears to differ also with a Commission accountant who testified in
1945 that the cost of a current system of accounts "in sufficient detail
to answer a Robinson-Patman question" would be "enormous."
Those who have called the cost defense illusory have considered .it
successful only three times (Bird & Son, B. F. Goodrich Co. and
Sylvania Electric Prods.) and partially successful twice (Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulation Co. and U. S. Rubber Co.). Professor Taggart
agrees that his own review of fifteen litigated cases tends to support this
position, and adds: "The fact that substantially all treble damage suits
are settled out 'of court is eloquent testimony that defendants generally
share the opinion that the cost defense is 'illusory'." Nevertheless, he'ii
optimistic. 'First, he strikes "partially" from the partially successful
cases (to which he adds Goodyear), since the companies did successfully
justify some price differences-although less than the ones at which thM
had sold. Then he adds four cases which lacked extensive cost litiga-
tion, the' complaints having been dismissed because the responden6
showed the Commission staff a satisfactory justification. Furthermore,
the Thompson Products Co., in 1958 and 1959, cost-justified some of its
prices, though not all. Thus the defense "batting average" is lifted to
"not less than .500."2 Finally, he is encouraged by the fact that a cost
defense has been successful in "an unknown number of informal pro-
ceedings."
The book constitutes a thorough piece of research, which undoubtedly
involved all the "drudgery" in preparation that the author mentions.
'As a batting average this is unprecedented. As a fielding average-perhaps
more applicable to a company which considers any trip to court as an unwanted
"error"-it is low for any league above the Cub Scouts. But Professor Taggar
feels that respondents' techniques can be improved, which would raise the average'.
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For an accountant experienced in cost analysis, it is probably easy to
read. For an economist, presumably for a lawyer, and possibly even
for many accounts, it is hard work, requiring sustained concentration
and some mental rest between cases. For a lawyer called in to pass on
the legality of a company's discount schedule or to represent a firm in
a cost justification case, most of the details in the book will have to be
mastered.
Especially important are the eight "rules of the game" derived by the
author from the case material. For example, respondents cannot justify
charging less of the overhead costs to the favored buyer on the theory
that his order is the differential (marginal) one, nor can they allocate
overhead costs according to total dollar sales made to different classes of
customers (thus automatically reducing the cost per unit where the price
is lower). On the other hand, the use of samples (e.g., three sales
branches only, for U.S. Rubber Co.) is acceptable, and current ad-
vertising or selling expense need not be charged to sales of unbranded
products provided there is "no appreciable general knowledge that the
particular manufacturers made the unbranded or private-brand articles
in question."
Although Professor Taggart avoids "second-guessing the courts
or the Commission" occasional differences between his views and those
of the Commission accounts do appear in the discussion of cases and in
the: Appendix. That these are not vital is clear from the opinion of the
book held by the Commission's accounting staff-that it will be a very
valuable tool for all private practitioners dealing with cost justifica-
tion.8
SImoN N. WHITNErY.
Director, Bureau of Economics
Federal Trade Commission.
The Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations
(1789-1957). By Paul Sehmidlhauser. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press. 1958. Pp. 252. $5.00.
No judicial tribunal in the world is surrounded with as much
mystery and misunderstanding as the United States Supreme Court.
Despite all the attention and analysis thrust upon it through the years,
the Court remains for most people an enigma wrapped in darkness.
Many of its outspoken critics and defenders show little real compre-
hension of the Court's functions, powers, limitations and responsibilities.
The Court's written opinions, which few people bother to read, are sub-
, ' The Commission's own report, Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting
(or Manufacturing and Wholesaling (1941), is the other important work dealing
with cost justification. It is out of print, though available in many libraries.
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jected too often to attack or defense in apathetic disegard of the institu-
tional mosaic.
These public misconceptions about the Court are nowhere more
dramatically underlined than in relation to its significant and sometimes
critical role in the effectuation of our federal form of government.
Areas of conflict and doubt as between federal and state power are in-
evitable within the broad constitutional framework. Some agency, some
final authority, must exist to resolve those situations of doubt. Neither
the President nor Congress can operate effectively to decide the nice
constitutional problems thus created; they can do little more than assert
or withhold federal power. And state agencies and courts provide weak
reeds to support the creation of uniform, binding declarations as to the
constitutional interplay of the competing forces. Thus when the two
powers collide only an institution possessing pervasive influence over
both areas of action can effectively bring to bear all the concepts of
federal-state relations established by the Constitutional framers. That
body is the Supreme Court of the United States.
Perhaps a failure to recognize the absolute necessity for an umpire
to call the plays in the federal game of government lies at the heart of
much of the unfounded criticism of the Court in this area of its func-
tions. Professor Schmidhauser performs a valuable service, therefore,
in pointing once again to the debate leading to the adoption of the
Constitution and to the recognition given by the framers to the need for
designating the Supreme Court as the final arbiter in federal-state mat-
ters. The shrill cries of the modern states' righters that the Court has
usurped its function in dealing with problems of state power find their
quiet and definitive answer in the great debates in and around the Phila-
delphia Convention. Indeed, the advocates of a strictly limited central
government were the strongest proponents in 1787 of the establishment
of federal judicial power to resolve federal-state conflicts. As Thomas
Jefferson put it, "Would not an appeal from the state judicatures to a
federal court in all cases where the act of Confederation controlled the
question, be as effectual a remedy, and exactly commensurate to the
defect?"
The great bulk of Professor Schmidhauser's volume is devoted to a
sketch of the manner in which the Court has performed its historically
sanctioned role of arbiter. He divides the Court's history in this respect
into eight segments following the first formative decade, segments which
are designated by the name of one or more of the Chief Justices of these
periods. He describes in rather hasty and sometimes unsatisfactory
detail the relevant and outstanding opinions of those eras, rendering a
judgment as to whether the Court in each period exhibited a balanced
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statesmanship in recognizing the proper scope of state power while
giving effect to the cardinal principle of federal supremacy.
Acknowledging "the essentially political aspect of the Supreme
Court's role in federal-state relations," the author finally concludes that
"like its immediate predecessor [the Hughes Court], the Stone-Vinson-
Warren Court treated questions of federal competence within the broad
constructionist tradition, while generally enforcing the constitutional
limitations on the states in such a manner as to avoid the substitution
of federal judicial for state legislative wisdom." While the Court in its
checkered career has consistently demonstrated a "potentiality for en-
gendering conflict" it has succeeded in becoming a "tremendous influ-
ence" as arbiter in "shaping social policy in the name of American
federalism."
Professor Schmidhauser's thesis is essentially accurate. The Supreme
Court is, in a very real sense, a political institution in this realm of
federal-state relations. It is a political institution in the very finest and
most judicial sense of that term. And because the Court's function
here is so essentially political the Court's activities have been both de-
batable and politically explosive. But this thesis is not easily under-
stood or accepted by those who tend to pass quick and loud judgment
on the Court. Professor Schmidhauser, unfortunately, does little to
demonstrate the underlying foundations of this thesis.
True, he exhibits an awareness of some of the major factors im-
plicit and explicit in the performance of the Court's necessarily political
role as judicial umpire, such as: (1) the generality of the Constitution
and its susceptibility to more than one interpretation; (2) the vast dis-
cretion and responsibility thereby given to the individual Justices in
fulfilling their functions; (3) the very nature of the judicial process with
its coexistent emphases upon logical symmetry, continuity with the
past, and adaptation to meet changing conditions; (4) the conscious and
unconscious predilections which influence individual members of the
Court despite their lip-service to complete impartiality; (5) the serious
problems stemming from the nature of the selection and tenure of the
Justices; and (6) the propensity of litigation within the boundaries of
American federalism to mirror "practically every major political, eco-
nomic, or sociological question which has been of importance in the
United States since 1789."
But the author does little more than bow in the direction of these
factors; he concludes rather than analyzes or explains. To understand
the Court as federal-state arbiter is to understand the basic nature of the
Court in our form of government. And that understanding requires
a deep synthesis of the elements of the Supreme Court processes with the
[Vol. 38
19601 BOOK REVIEWS 417
decisions that are rendered, a synthesis of the problems faced by the
Court and the alternative solutions available to it. Such a synthesis is
not present in this book and the result is that those committed to more
superficial and erroneous concepts of the Court's functions will remain
unconvinced.
Still, this book does perform a valuable function in bringing together
in short, readable form the panorama of Court decisions in this most
vital area of litigation. Valuable hints and bits of information are
supplied as to the continually evolving nature of the Court's functions
and activities in federal-state relations. But the basic explanations of
why the Court has acted and will continue to act as a political institution
in this respect, and why the Court must of necessity so act, await another
day.
EUGENE GRESSMAN
Member of the Washington, D. C., Bar.

